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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. O1 arrived in the United States in 1997, fleeing persecution and
genocide in his small central African country.  Mr. O filed for asylum
affirmatively before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (USCIS); however, because of severe emotional and physical
problems, he was unable to apply until 2001.  The USCIS asylum officer
who heard Mr. O’s case in 2004 declined to grant Mr. O asylum, instead
referring Mr. O to an immigration judge in the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) on the grounds that he had failed to file for
asylum within a year of arriving in the United States, even though he had,
as the immigration judge would later note, an extraordinarily strong
exception to the one–year filing deadline.  In 2007, Mr. O received a final
grant of asylum from the immigration judge.  Despite being a bona fide
refugee with an extraordinarily strong protection claim, Mr. O was forced
to undergo a prolonged asylum process, which was exacerbated by the
decision of the USCIS asylum officer not to grant asylum.  As a result,
seven years after filing for asylum affirmatively, and more than 10 years
after arriving in the United States, Mr. O is still waiting to be reunited
with his minor children, whom he was forced to leave behind when he
fled Africa.  Unfortunately, Mr. O’s case is not unique.  In the aftermath
of the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), a greater percentage of affirm-
ative asylum seekers in the United States are facing a prolonged asylum
process.
Under international law, the United States is obligated to provide pro-
tection to persons fleeing from persecution.2  With these obligations in
mind, the United States created a multi-tiered process whereby protec-
tion seekers in the United States can apply for asylum.  In the aftermath
of the events of 9/11, however, the number of asylum applications
1 Mr. O is a former client of the author, and has given his permission for his story
to be used in this article.
2 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [together hereinafter U.N. Refugee Convention]. See infra
Part II.
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received in the United States dropped significantly, as did the asylum
grant rate at both USCIS asylum offices and EOIR immigration courts.3
Although the asylum grant rate in EOIR immigration courts rebounded
to pre-9/11 levels by 2003, the asylum grant rate at USCIS has remained
significantly lower than pre-9/11 rates.4
The ultimate effect of this post 9/11 change in grant rates is that a
greater proportion of affirmative asylum seekers are unsuccessful in their
claims at the first stage of the asylum process before USCIS asylum
officers and, consequently, pay a much higher cost in time, resources, and
mental well-being because they are referred to EOIR immigration courts
where they must defend their claims a second time.  Yet, of those individ-
uals referred by USCIS asylum officers to EOIR immigration judges in
2007, 51 percent were ultimately granted asylum by an immigration
judge.5  In other words, more than half of all affirmative asylum seekers
referred to immigration judges have valid claims, but are nevertheless
forced to undergo a prolonged asylum process and the harmful conse-
quences of that prolonged process.
Part II of this article will look at the obstacles asylum-seekers confront
in getting to the United States, as well as the process they face once they
apply for asylum, with a focus on the first two stages of the affirmative
asylum process in the United States.  This section will also provide an
analysis of asylum statistics at USCIS asylum offices and EOIR immigra-
tion courts over the past decade.  Part III of this article will offer possible
reasons for why the asylum grant rate at USCIS has dropped so signifi-
cantly post-9/11.  Finally, Part IV will analyze the devastating conse-
quences that a prolonged asylum process can have on the lives of many
asylum seekers with valid claims.
II. OBTAINING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States is obligated under international law to provide relief
to persons fleeing from persecution in the form of refugee status or asy-
lum.  The United States’ obligations arise first and foremost under the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees
(together the “U.N. Refugee Convention”), which the United States rati-
3 See infra Table 2: USCIS Asylum Cases Filed or Reopened, Decided on the
Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates; see infra Table 3: EOIR Asylum Applications
Received, Decided on the Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates.
4 See infra Table 2: USCIS Asylum Cases Filed or Reopened, Decided on the
Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates; see infra Table 3: EOIR Asylum Applications
Received, Decided on the Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates.
5 See infra Table 4: EOIR Affirmative and Defensive Grant Rates.
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fied in 1968.6  Other international agreements relevant to U.S. obligations
to provide relief to persons fleeing persecution include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,7 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,8 and the United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.9  In
addition, some U.S. courts have looked to customary international law as
guidance in claims involving human rights.10
Under domestic law, U.S. obligations towards persons seeking protec-
tion are found primarily in the Refugee Act of 1980, which established
the process for obtaining asylum, granted the Attorney General the
authorization and discretion to grant asylum, and codified certain provi-
sions from the U.N. Refugee Convention, including the definition of “ref-
ugee.”11  Both refugees and asylees, in order to receive protection, must
meet the U.S. statutory definition of a refugee, which is derived from the
U.N. Refugee Convention:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s national-
ity . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion . . . .12
Refugees and asylum-seekers are, however, distinguished by where
they apply for protection.  Refugees apply for status while outside of the
United States.  Refugee status is granted after a determination is made by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to refer
an individual for approval and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) concurs that the protection seeker meets the definition of a refu-
gee.  The President of the United States and Congress, acting in consulta-
tion, decide how many refugees, and from which groups, to admit and
6 U.N. Refugee Convention, supra note 2. See also IRA J. KURZBAN, R
IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE AND REFERENCE
TOOL 341 (10th ed. 2006).
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 9, opened for
signature Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
9 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
10 See  Kurzban, supra note 6, at 342. R
11 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); Immigration and Nationality
Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2008). See also Kurzban, supra note 6, at R
343; Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
47, 53 (2004).
12 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A).
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resettle in the United States each year.13  Asylum seekers, on the other
hand, must request protection while inside the United States or at its bor-
ders.14  It is only through the asylum process that adjudicators in United
States, rather than UN or other personnel abroad, determine whether an
applicant qualifies for asylum.  Thus, once an asylum seeker has reached
the United States, the United States Government is in a unique position
vis-a-vis the asylum seeker.  The U.S.  Government must act, either to
grant protection or to send the asylum seeker back to his or her country
of origin.15  As a result, the burden is higher on the U.S. Government
when faced with a protection seeker at or within its borders to ensure that
protection seekers with valid claims are granted asylum in accordance
with international treaty obligations.
However, U.S. immigration laws enacted in the last decade (particu-
larly those enacted after 9/11), the asylum process, and even adjudicators
themselves, have shown an ever-increasing bias against protection seek-
ers, who are increasingly viewed as criminals or illegal immigrants.16 As a
result, it is harder than ever for an asylum seeker, particularly an affirma-
tive asylum seeker with a valid claim, to win an asylum application in the
United States.
A. Getting to the United States
The first hurdle to obtaining asylum in any country is to successfully
reach the shores of that country.  However, it is increasingly difficult for
those seeking asylum to reach a country where they can present an asy-
13 8 U.S.C. § 1157. See Resettlement Section of UNHCR Washington, US
Resettlement Overview, http://www.usaforunhcr.org/usaforunhcr/uploadedfiles/
OVERVW06.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(1).
15 See Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference
for Persecuted People, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 413, 448 (2006) (“To deny admission to
refugees at our border, and force them to return to countries to face serious harm,
violates the injunction to ‘do no harm,’ and thus implicates us in having caused their
plight.”).
16 See THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
(UNHCR), THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 2006 61 (2006) [hereinafter UNHCR STATE OF THE WORLD’S
REFUGEES] (“More and more, asylum seekers are portrayed not as refugees fleeing
persecution and entitled to sanctuary, but rather as illegal migrants, potential
terrorists and criminals–or at a minimum, as ‘bogus.’”); see also Erika Feller, Asylum,
Migration and Refugee Protection: Realties, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come,
18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 509, 514, 519 (2006); Ninette Kelley, International Refugee
Protection Challenges and Opportunities, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 401, 418-19 (2007);
Andy McSmith & Anne Penketh, Millions of Refugees Are Hidden Victims of the
West’s War of Terror, Warns U.N., THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Apr. 19, 2006, at 4.
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lum claim.17  Only a fraction of refugees have the means to reach the
industrialized world and apply for asylum.18  A primary reason for this,
no doubt, is the cost associated with the necessary travel to reach foreign
borders.  An asylum seeker must be able to afford these costs, or have the
assistance of a person or organization able to afford these costs.  How-
ever, in recent years there has also been an increased focus at the interna-
tional level on policies of migration control and deterrence at the expense
of refugees.19  In the past few years, many states have begun to imple-
ment border and immigration measures, including forced deportations,
making it more difficult than ever for asylum seekers to apply for protec-
tion in foreign countries even when they can afford to do so.20
If an asylum seeker wishes to reach the United States legally, he must
have a valid passport from his home country and, in most cases, must
obtain a U.S. visa.  Applicants for nonimmigrant visas have always faced
challenges in obtaining such a visa, particularly applicants from poorer
parts of the world.  According to a report issued by DHS and the U.S.
Department of State, “(e)mbassies may appear to disproportionately
refuse applicants from less developed regions of the world, or from poor
sectors of the population, but it can be much more difficult for applicants
who are unemployed or marginally employed to show that they intend to
17 See Feller, supra note 16, at 519; see also Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, The Limits R
of Idealism: Rethinking American Refugee Policy in an Insecure World, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 401, 407 (2007).  At the end of 2006, there were 9,877,707 refugees
throughout the world and 743,937 people seeking asylum. See UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2006 45 (2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/478ce2e62.pdf.
18 See Price, supra note 15, at 447 (noting that the poor, particularly women and R
children, are less likely to make it to an industrialized country); see also Nicholas Van
Hear, “I Went as Far as My Money Would Take Me:” Conflict, Forced Migration and
Class 12 (Ctr. on Migration, Pol’y & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 6, 2004) (discussing the
part class plays on migration patterns).
19 See Feller, supra note 16, at 516 (“Where refugees are seen as little more than a R
sub-group of irregular migrants, the control of their movement is likely to take
precedence over meeting their protection needs, with asylum laws often being but a
part of more general immigration restriction legislation in many countries.”); see also
Kelley, supra note 16, at 406-07; see generally UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S R
REFUGEES, supra note 16. R
20 See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, supra note 16, at 1; see R
also Kelley, supra note 16, at 406-07 (noting, for example, that in 2002 Tanzania and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo forcibly deported thousands of protection
seekers, and that in 2003, Malaysia and Panama likewise deported hundreds of
asylum-seekers and refugees). See also Jodef Roy Benedict, States Must Provide
Protection, NEW STRAIT TIMES (Malaysia), June 21, 2007 (noting that Europe has
implemented stricter border controls and other measures to prevent asylum seekers
from reaching European countries including interception operations in the
Mediterranean.).
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return to their country after visiting the United States.”21  Furthermore,
while nonimmigrant visas may be authorized for specific purposes, these
do not include seeking protection.22
However, it has become increasingly difficult in the post-9/11 world to
obtain a nonimmigrant visa to the United States.  Statistics from the U.S.
Department of State indicate that nonimmigrant visas are now issued far
less frequently than just prior to the events of 9/11.23  After  9/11 the
United States implemented a variety of new restrictions on the issuance
of visas.  Since January 11, 2002, as part of the Visa Condor Program, all
male, and some female, applicants between the ages of 16 and 45 from 26
(mostly Islamic) nations of security interest must undergo new security
procedures in order to obtain a U.S. visa.24  In July 2003, the Department
of State mandated that consular officials conduct most visa interviews
face-to-face with the applicant, a mandate that was codified in the Intelli-
gence and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.25  The Visa Waiver Program
(VWP), under which nationals of certain countries are exempt from hav-
ing to obtain visas to enter the United States for a visit or business, and
are not required to undergo a consular interview or pre-inspection, was
also restricted.26 After September 11, 2001, the United States suspended
the VWP for Argentina and Uruguay for security-related reasons.27  In
2002, under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
21 HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS & DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, A PRIMER ON VISA AND VISAS FRAUD 7 (2008),
http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2008,0708-visafraud.pdf.
22 See also Kelley, supra note 16, at 420. R
23 See infra Table 1: Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics by Region.
24 Visas Condor security checks also required explicit approval from Washington
for each applicant. See Wendy D. White & Lois Peterson, Visas for Visiting Scientists
and Students: Current Situation, 46 PHYSIOLOGIST 47, 49 (2003).  See also Donald
Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a Coordinated National
Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 387-88 (2007).
25 Kerwin & Stock, supra note 24, at 387 (citing Documentation of Nonimmigrants R
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 40127 (July 7, 2003)(interim
rule) and Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-
458, § 5301, 118 Stat. 3638).
26 As of November 2008, 35 countries were approved to participate in the VWP:
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  U.S. Department of State, Visa Waiver Program
(VWP), http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2009).
27 See Kerwin & Stock, supra note 24, at 387, 402-03. R
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2002, Congress mandated regular reviews of those countries still partici-
pating in the VWP.28
Not surprisingly, some asylum seekers use fraudulent documents to
travel.29  However, sanctions are increasingly imposed on carriers that
transport undocumented or improperly documented foreigners, which
have led to increased screening by transport employees.30  DHS has
increased the number of its personnel overseas to help foreign airline per-
sonnel identify improperly documented aliens to prevent them from
boarding planes to the United States.31  Pursuant to the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, DHS expanded its pre-inspection
program at foreign airports and placed additional U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection inspectors at foreign airports in order to prevent persons
identified as national security threats from entering the United States.32
Thus, even for those who can afford the travel expenses, getting to the
United States, especially from certain parts of the world, is becoming
more difficult regardless of whether one travels with valid or fraudulent
travel documents.
It has also gotten harder for those protection seekers who attempt to
enter the United States without documentation or inspection.  Persons
who arrive at a U.S. border without proper documentation are subject to
expedited removal.33  In 2004, the U.S. Government expanded the expe-
28 Enhanced Border Securoty and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, § 307(a)(1)(2), 116 Stat. 543, 556.
29 Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service Fact Sheet: Refugee, Asylum
Seeker, Immigrant: What Do These Terms Really Mean?, http://www.lirs.org/InfoRes/
PDFs/FactSheet—Terms.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)(noting that “[p]eople who
must flee their countries quickly or who for some other reason cannot access the
refugee resettlement process become asylum seekers. . . . Usually they are forced to
flee without proper documentation such as a passport  and visa . . . .”).
30 Kelley, supra note 16, at 420-21. R
31 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2005),
available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf.
32 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE (CRS ), IMMIGRATION: TERRORIST GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION AND
REMOVAL OF ALIENS 18 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32564.pdf.
See also Kelley, supra note 16, at 421 (noting that there are pre-clearance consular R
sections in certain transportation hubs including, for example, in Aruba, Bermuda,
Canada, Ireland, and soon, Mexico).
33 If apprehended, a person to whom expedited removal applies is detained and
removed to his or her country of origin as soon as possible, and is not permitted to see
an immigration judge unless he or she is determined to have a credible fear of return
to his or her own country.  Any person who expresses a fear of return or an intention
to apply for asylum is referred to a USCIS asylum officer for a “credible fear”
interview.  If found to have a credible fear, he or she is taken out of the expedited
removal process, automatically detained, and placed in removal proceedings before
an immigration judge. See Simona Agnolucci, Note, Expedited Removal: Suggestions
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dited removal process for persons without documentation found at or
near the U.S. border,34 without sufficiently protecting the rights of such
persons to apply for asylum.35  In addition, U.S. Coast Guard and naval
forces have intercepted and forcibly returned persons arriving by sea
without documentation, with very little process for determining if asylum
claims exist.36
For those asylum seekers who are able to make it to the United States,
their struggle has only just begun.  Many asylum seekers have to contend
with culture shock; an inability to speak the language; no friends, family,
or other support; and an extremely complex and confusing legal process.
Even those who do manage to navigate the U.S. asylum process face an
uphill battle to convince an adjudicator that their asylum claim is
legitimate.
for Reform in Light of the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom Report and the Real ID Act, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 619, 623-24 (2006).
34 Specifically, expedited removal was expanded to land borders between ports of
entry, and to anyone arrested within 100 miles of the Mexico or Arizona border
within 14 days of their arrival in the Unites States. See Press Release, Department of
Homeland Security, DHS Announces Expanded Border Control Plans (Aug. 10,
2004) (on file with author); see also id. at 623-24.
35 In 2005, the Unites States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF), a bipartisan federal commission, released a study on expedited removal
which showed that some immigration officials were improperly processing asylum
seekers for deportation.  Specifically, in 15 percent of the cases observed by USCIRF
members, immigration officials failed to refer illegal immigrants to credible fear
interviews, even when the immigrant expressed a fear of return. U.S. COMM’N ON
INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL,
VOLUME I: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 31, at 20.  See also Rachel L. R
Swarns, Rights Group Criticize Speedy Deportations,  N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at
A9; Agnolucci, supra note 33, at 623-24. R
36 Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections of Refoulment and Haitian Centers Council, 35
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 3 (1994) (noting that Haitians arriving in American waters in the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s  were subject to interdiction and repatriation without
having their asylum claims adjudicated). Kelley, supra note 16, at 423 (noting that in R
2004, the Bush Administration had a blanket policy of forcibly returning any Haitians
intercepted at sea).
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TABLE 1: NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY REGION
OF NATIONALITY37
Near East South & Western
Africa, East Asia Europe & & North Central Hemi-
Sub-Saharan & Pacific Eurasia Africa Other38 Asia sphere Total
1998 208,342 1,430,081 1,088,242 366,145 23,387 385,054 2,312,902 5,814,153
1999 218,529 1,457,532 1,069,867 385,493 23,003 430,091 2,607,963 6,192,478
2000 239,837 1,653,148 1,080,822 419,247 21,269 539,104 3,188,209 7,141,636
2001 265,511 1,640,446 1,050,641 408,758 17,622 545,836 3,659,964 7,588,778
2002 211,381 1,331,309 876,083 220,328 13,670 400,208 2,716,458 5,769,437
2003 206,191 1,201,053 841,700 195,583 7,689 398,917 2,030,499 4,881,632
2004 213,150 1,270,021 897,928 214,710 3,987 454,358 1,994,945 5,049,099
2005 209,059 1,431,912 973,278 250,899 3,101 454,268 2,066,420 5,388,937
2006 203,928 1,550,710 1,054,540 280,064 2,721 531,759 2,212,996 5,836,718
2007 224,163 1,674,714 1,015,815 334,753 3,005 749,294 2,442,512 6,444,256
FIGURE 1: NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY REGION OF NATIONALITY
37 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2007, Table XVIII,
available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07AnnualReportTableXVIII.pdf.
38 Other includes “no nationality” and “United Nations Laissez-Passer” (UN
personnel traveling on special documents). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF
THE VISA OFFICE 2007, supra note 37, at Table XVIII.
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B. The Affirmative Asylum Process in the United States
Once in the United States, an applicant can apply for asylum affirma-
tively through a USCIS asylum office in the DHS.  If an applicant is not
successful in her application, she is generally referred to an EOIR Immi-
gration Judge in the Department of Justice and placed in removal pro-
ceedings, requiring that the applicant pursue her asylum claim
defensively.  If the immigration judge denies asylum, the applicant can
appeal her case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and from
there to a Federal Circuit Court.39  For an affirmative asylum seeker, the
most important level of the process is before a USCIS asylum officer; if
an applicant is successful at that stage, she can more quickly begin a new
and safe life in the United States, begin healing if she suffered trauma,
and reunite with her family.
USCIS and EOIR both regularly publish statistics on asylum applica-
tions, including application receipts, grants, and denials.  However, each
agency generates its statistics in a different manner, and each agency
makes different data sets publicly available.  Thus, it is almost impossible
to compare the statistics of each agency.40  Accordingly, this article will
analyze the statistical data available for each agency separately and iden-
tify trends within each agency.
1. Applying for Asylum Affirmatively at USCIS
An applicant may apply for asylum affirmatively if he is not already in
detention or in removal proceedings.  An applicant who files for asylum
affirmatively does so through one of the eight USCIS regional asylum
39 An analysis of the asylum grant rates at the appeal levels (BIA and Federal
Circuit Courts) is outside the scope of this article.
40 It is impossible to make a direct comparison of grant rates between EOIR and
USCIS.  As documented in the DHS Statistical Yearbooks, USCIS generates its
statistics by looking at asylum cases regardless of how many individuals are included
in any particular case. See, e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 55-60,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2004/Yearbook2004.
pdf [hereinafter 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS].  EOIR, however,
generates its statistics by looking at individual asylum seekers.  When an applicant
files for asylum, he or she is given an “A” number to identify his or her case.  Any
immediate family members who are in the United States are included in the
principal’s application as derivative asylum seekers, but all receive an individual “A”
number.  EOIR generates its statistics by looking at “A” numbers.  Telephone
interview by Tanya Powers with Elaine Thomas, Public Affairs, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, DHS (July 25, 2008). See, e.g., OFFICE OF PLANNING,
ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf [hereinafter
FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
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offices.41  The applicant files an I-589 Application for Asylum and With-
holding, along with any supporting documentation.  After receipt of the
application, the asylum office schedules an interview for the applicant
with an asylum officer.  The interview, which is considered non-adver-
sarial,42 is conducted in the asylum office or by an asylum officer on a
circuit ride in an appropriate USCIS local office.  After the interview, the
asylum officer grants asylum or, if the officer does not find that a valid
claim exists or finds that the applicant is otherwise inadmissible, refers
the applicant to an immigration court, where he is automatically placed in
removal proceedings.  Asylum officers may only deny asylum cases when
the applicant holds another valid status (e.g., foreign student).43
Not surprisingly, the absolute number of affirmative asylum applica-
tions filed in the United States dropped significantly after the events of 9/
11.  In 2007, only 32,213 asylum cases were filed or reopened with
USCIS.44  When compared with the 63,230 asylum application filed or
reopened in 2001, this represents a decline of 49%.45
The overall rate for grants of asylum by USCIS asylum officers also
dropped significantly after 9/11, and still has not rebounded to pre-9/11
levels.  In 2007, the overall USCIS asylum grant rate was 28%, which
41 There are regional asylum offices in Arlington, VA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX;
Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; Newark (Lyndhurst), NJ; New York (Rosedale), NY;
and San Francisco, CA. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services Office Locator,
https://egov.uscis.gov/crisgwi/go?action=offices.type&OfficeLocator.office_type=ZSY
(follow “Choose your state from the list” drop-down menu) (last visited July 11,
2008).
42 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2007).
43 In such cases, applicants cannot be placed in removal proceedings because they
have a valid status.  Prior to denying asylum in such cases, the asylum officer will issue
a Notice of Intent to Deny, allowing the applicant the opportunity to provide more
information.  Affirmative asylum applicants who are denied asylum in such
circumstances cannot appeal their case to the immigration judge.  Only if they are
later placed in removal proceedings after their valid status expires can they again raise
their asylum claim defensively. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (2000). See also Andrew I.
Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for
Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 741 n.11 (2002).  The number of asylum
applications denied by asylum officers under these circumstances typically represents
a very small percentage of cases not granted. See, e.g., 2004 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 55-60. R
44 See infra Table 2: USCIS Asylum Cases Filed or Reopened, Decided on the
Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates.
45 See infra Table 2: USCIS Asylum Cases Filed or Reopened, Decided on the
Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates.  In addition, every geographic region saw a
significant drop in the number of applications filed or reopened in 2007 as compared
to those filed or reopened pre-9/11.  Only applications from individuals in the
“Other” category, which includes stateless individuals and those whose nationality is
unknown, have returned to pre-9/11 levels. See  infra Appendix A: USCIS Asylum
Cases Filed or Reopened by Region.
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represents a 35% decrease from the 2001 USCIS asylum grant rate of
43%.46
TABLE 2: USCIS ASYLUM CASES FILED OR REOPENED, DECIDED ON
THE MERITS, GRANTED, AND GRANT RATES
Asylum Cases Filed or Asylum Cases Decided Asylum Cases Grant
Year Reopened During the Year on the Merits47 Granted Rate48
199849 55,428 42,738 9,949 23%
199950 42,207 34,544 13,241 38%
200051 46,776 37,897 16,549 44%
200152 63,230 47,043 20,306 43%
200253 63,427 52,607 18,998 36%
46 See infra Table 2: USCIS Asylum Cases Filed or Reopened, Decided on the
Merits, Granted, and Grant Rates.  Looking at grant rates regionally, the grant rate in
2007 for every geographic region in the world was also significantly less than the pre-
9/11 rates. See  infra Appendix B: USCIS Asylum Grant Rates by Region.
47 Includes cases granted, denied, or referred to an Immigration Judge after an
interview or because of a filing deadline issue.
48 The asylum grant rate is calculated as the number of cases granted divided by
the number of cases decided on the merits.
49 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1998
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 102,
105 (2000), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1998/
1998yb.pdf
50 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 100,
103 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1999/FY
99Yearbook.pdf.
51 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 100,
103 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2000/Year
book2000.pdf
52 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 102,
105 (2003), available at  http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2001/
yearbook2001.pdf
53 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 69, 72 (2003), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2002/Yearbook2002.pdf.
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200354 46,272 39,456 11,434 29%
200455 32,682 31,582 10,101 32%
200556 29,752 29,800 9,554 32%
200657 33,879 32,811 10,059 31%
200758 32,213 37,024 10,191 28%
FIGURE 2: USCIS—ASYLUM CASES FILED OR REOPENED
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54 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2003
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 60, 63 (2004), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf.
55 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 55, 58. R
56 E-mail from Sally Armstrong, Management & Program Analyst, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Services, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations - Asylum Division to Rachel D. Settlage, Clinical Fellow, University of
Baltimore School of Law (Sept. 22, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Armstrong email] (2005-2007 statistics).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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FIGURE 3: USCIS–ASYLUM GRANT RATES
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2. Applying for Asylum Defensively Before an EOIR Immigration
Court
If an asylum applicant is not granted asylum by a USCIS asylum
officer, she is generally referred to an EOIR immigration court.  Individ-
uals in detention or who are already in removal proceedings start their
asylum process defensively before an immigration court.  An applicant’s
first appearance is at a Master Calendar Hearing to determine the nature
of the relief sought and to set a date for a merits hearing.  The merits
hearing is an adversarial hearing in which the applicant presents her case,
including any witnesses, and is subject to cross-examination by a DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) trial attorney.  At the end
of the merits hearing, the immigration judge will decide either to grant
asylum or to deny asylum and enter an order for removal.
In 2007, EOIR immigration courts received 54,957 asylum cases from
individuals applying either affirmatively or defensively.59  When com-
pared with the 62,038 asylum cases received from individuals in 2001, this
represents a decline of eleven percent.60
59 See infra Table 3: EOIR Asylum Applications Received, Decided on the Merits,
Granted, and Grant Rates.
60 See infra Table 3: EOIR Asylum Applications Received, Decided on the Merits,
Granted, and Grant Rates.  Most geographic regions did not begin to see a significant
decline in the number of asylum applications, affirmative or defensive, received by
immigration courts until a couple of years after the events of 9/11.  However, with the
exception of the Western Hemisphere, the number of applications received in 2007
remains lower for every region when compared to pre-9/11 levels. See  infra
Appendix C: EOIR Asylum Applications Received by Region.
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In contrast to USCIS grant rates, by 2003 the overall grant rate for
asylum applications adjudicated by immigration judges had returned to
the pre-9/11 rate, and by 2007 actually surpassed the pre-9/11 rate.61
Thus, applicants are more likely to be granted asylum before an immigra-
tion judge today than before 9/11, while the opposite is true for applicants
applying affirmatively before USCIS asylum officers.  In other words, it
has become harder to win an asylum claim at the first stage of the asylum
process, and as a result, some legitimate asylum seekers are forced to
undergo a prolonged process.  The detrimental effects resulting from this
prolonged process will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.
TABLE 3: EOIR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED, DECIDED ON THE
MERITS, GRANTED, AND GRANT RATES
Total Asylum Asylum Applications Individuals Grant
Year Applications Received62 Decided on the Merits63 Granted Asylum Rate64
1998 72,08065 27,53466 7,25267 26%
1999 54,91668 26,59069 8,35570 31%
2000 51,96771 25,25772 8,90573 35%
61 See infra Table 3: EOIR Asylum Applications Received, Decided on the Merits,
Granted, and Grant Rates.
62 Includes both affirmative & defensive asylum applications.
63 Includes both affirmative & defensive asylum applications.
64 The asylum grant rate is calculated as the number of cases granted divided by
the number of cases decided on the merits (i.e. cases granted, conditionally granted,
or denied).
65 OFFICE OF PLANNING & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2002
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy
02syb.pdf [hereinafter FY 2002 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
66 Id. at K1.
67 Office of Planning and Analysis, U.S. Department of Justice, Asylum Statistics:
Fiscal Year 1998, 1 (Jan. 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY98AsyStats.pdf
[hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 1998].
68 OFFICE OF PLANNING & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2003
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy
03syb.pdf [hereinafter FY 2003 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
69 Id. at K1.
70 Office of Planning and Analysis, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration
Courts: FY 1999 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 20, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/
FY99AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 1999].
71 OFFICE OF PLANNING & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2004
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy
04syb.pdf [hereinafter FY 2004 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK].
72 Id. at K2.
73 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2000 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY00AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2000].
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2001 62,03874 25,03775 7,95676 32%
2002 74,71277 29,36778 8,66079 29%
2003 67,26880 35,79081 12,91182 36%
2004 57,67283 33,88584 12,35285 36%
2005 53,16086 30,92487 11,49388 37%
2006 55,65489 29,91890 13,35291 45%
2007 54,95792 27,65793 12,80794 46%
74 OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY
2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1, (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy05syb.pdf [hereinafter FY 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK]
75 Id. at K2.
76 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2001 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY01AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2001].
77 OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY
2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy06syb.pdf [hereinafter FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK]
78 Id. at K2.
79 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2002 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY02AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2002].
80 FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at I1. R
81 Id. at K2.
82 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2003 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY03AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2003].
83 FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at I1. R
84 Id. at K2.
85 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2004 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY04AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2004].
86 FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at I1. R
87 Id. at K2.
88 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2005 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY05AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2005].
89 FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at I1. R
90 Id. at K2.
91 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2006 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY06AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2006].
92 FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at I1. R
93 Id. at K2.
94 Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration Courts: FY 2007 Asylum Statistics, 9 (April 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY07AsyStats.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Statistics FY 2007].
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FIGURE 4: EOIR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED
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FIGURE 5: EOIR ASYLUM GRANT RATES
III. ANALYSIS OF REDUCED ASYLUM GRANT RATES AT USCIS
ASYLUM OFFICES
Given the expanded restrictions on both nonimmigrant and immigrant
entry into the United States, it is not surprising that the overall number of
affirmative asylum applications received by USCIS dropped and has not
returned to the pre-9/11 level.  What is not so clear is why the grant rate
for affirmative asylum applications before the USCIS also dropped so
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significantly, but unlike the EOIR asylum grant rate, has not rebounded.
The answer may lie in the fact that asylum law is becoming increasingly
complex and restrictive at a time when asylum offices are overburdened
and understaffed, and applicants more often than not are unrepresented
by counsel.
A. Asylum Officers
The Asylum Officer Corps (AOC) was created in 1990 in order to
develop professional asylum officers who were specially trained to handle
asylum claims.95  New asylum officers complete two five-week training
courses, in addition to periodic local training.96  All asylum decisions are
reviewed by supervisory asylum officers, and each asylum office has at
least one quality assurance or training officer to monitor the supervisory
asylum officers.97  Nevertheless, despite this training and these oversight
mechanisms, there is inconsistency – at times significant inconsistency –
in the grant rates between and within asylum offices.98
While the training of asylum officers is thorough, asylum officers need
only have a bachelor’s degree to be eligible for the job, and, as a result,
only some asylum officers have a law degree.99  Without a law degree, it is
95 54 Fed. Reg. 30,676 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.1).
96 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2006 REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, Appendix D: Department of Homeland Security International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71482.htm.
See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Core Occupations, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
13b7f41e89a0e010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=64039c7755cb90
10VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (under Asylum Officer (AO)) (last visited July 1,
2008) (“Part 1 of the Asylum Officer basic training course is 51/2 -weeks long and
includes instruction in the following subject areas: Immigration Law, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services Adjudication Process and Procedures, Naturalization
Process and Procedures, Fraudulent Document Detection, EEO, Sexual Harassment,
and Utilization of Immigration Data Base Systems. Part 2 of the Asylum Officer basic
training course is a 5-week long Asylum-specific training. Topics include United
States Asylum and Refugee Law, International Human Rights Law, Interviewing
Techniques, Decision-Making and Decision-Writing Skills, Effective Country
Conditions Research using Computer Data Bases and other Reference Materials, and
Utilization of Immigration Asylum Data Base System. In order to successfully
complete basic training all officers must obtain a score of 70% or better in each of the
major areas of study, as well as satisfactorily complete all required Practical
Exercises.”).
97 Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 311 (2007) (noting as well that the Asylum Office headquarters
also has various quality assurance and training staff).
98 See id. at 313-25.  “[T]he existing mechanisms have not created a just system in
all regional offices for those whom America wants to protect.” Id. at 325.
99 In 2004, only sixty percent of the asylum officer corps had a graduate degree or
had completed some level of graduate coursework.  Immigration Officer Academy,
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unlikely that asylum officers have all of the skills they need to truly
understand and apply the highly complex law that governs the granting of
asylum.  This situation is exacerbated by the fact that immigration law is
rapidly changing and has undergone some significant and intricate modi-
fications since 9/11.
In addition, asylum offices are understaffed and overburdened, leading
to arduous work conditions for asylum officers.  Asylum officers must
conduct up to 18 asylum interviews in a two-week pay period in addition
to researching the individual cases and country conditions following each
interview, and writing detailed decisions.100  After other work require-
ments such as local training and administrative duties, asylum officers
have only a few hours to meet with each applicant and render a deci-
sion.101  The USCIS Ombudsman, in his 2007 Annual Report, further
noted that “[a]sylum officers seem to have extremely limited access to
any investigative support – locally and internationally – to help verify
events, locations, and persons referenced in asylum applications.  As
applicant credibility is critical to asylum determinations, asylum officers
should have timely access to investigative services to corroborate
claims.”102
Under these conditions, it is impossible for asylum officers to ade-
quately research each case and render well-reasoned and considered
opinions in all, or even most, cases.  Even the Asylum Officer Basic
Training Course Manual notes that “if the productivity rate for affirma-
tive asylum applications is set too high, the quality of adjudications would
likely suffer.”103  At the same time, however, it fails to recognize that the
Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson: Corps Values and Goals, at 7 (Jan. 28,
2004), available at http://www.rmscdenver.org/legal_aobtc2.html.
100 In fact, asylum officers are rated in their performance evaluations on their
ability to complete eighteen cases in the two-week pay period. Id. at 8, 10.  From the
inception of the asylum officer corps, asylum officers were expected to handle large
caseloads; in 1992, it was estimated that asylum officers would have only three hours
to devote to each case and that they would complete twelve cases per week.  Gregg A.
Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 253,
275 (1992).
101 See Benjamin Johnson & Walter A. Ewing, Asylum Essentials: The U.S. Asylum
Program Needs More Resources, Not Restrictions, Immigration Policy Ctr. (Feb.
2005), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/index.php?content=PR0502 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).  Asylum officers typically do not receive the asylum application until
the morning of the interview.  Immigration Equality, LGBT/HIV Asylum Manual,
http://immigrationequality.org/manual_template.php?id=1049#D_26_7 (last visited
June 10, 2007).
102 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL REPORT 2007, 95 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_2007.pdf.
103 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
Corps Values and Goals, supra note 99, at 11. R
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current productivity standard of eighteen cases in a two-week period is
too high.  It is not surprising that in an anonymous survey conducted by
the American Federation of Government Employees, a number of asy-
lum officers indicated that they have a low level of confidence in the
accuracy of their decisions.104  This may explain, in part, why asylum
officers refer so many cases to immigration judges that are ultimately
judged to be legitimate: they do not have the confidence to grant asylum
in those cases in which there is a difficult or complex issue.
B. Access to Lawyers
One of the most important factors in determining the success of an
asylum claim is whether or not an applicant is represented by counsel.105
Studies have shown that asylum seekers represented by counsel are three
times more likely to succeed.106  However, while asylum seekers at all
stages in the process may be represented by an attorney, they must pro-
vide one at no cost to the government.107  The government does not pro-
vide counsel for asylum seekers, including for those detained.108  Only
one in three asylum applicants in affirmative proceedings before USCIS
104 Johnson & Ewing, supra note 101 (citing an anonymous survey conducted in R
2004 by the American Federation of Government Employees; “The survey elicited
responses from 177 Asylum Officers (47 percent of the Asylum Corps) at seven of the
eight asylum offices.  Among the respondents, 93 percent routinely worked unpaid
overtime even though that is prohibited by agency regulations.  Among the reasons
most commonly cited for doing so were that there is insufficient time to do quality
work during a 40-hour week (100 percent of respondents), unpaid overtime is
necessary to complete cases in compliance with timeliness standards (92 percent), and
unpaid overtime is necessary to avoid creating a case backlog (91 percent)”).
105 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 97, at 340 (“[W]hether an asylum seeker is R
represented in court is the single most important factor affecting the outcome of her
case.”).
106 See id.  (noting that represented asylum seekers were granted asylum 45.6
percent of the time, while those without representation were granted asylum only 16.3
percent of the time.); see also Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)
Immigration Report, Immigration Judges, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160
(last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (finding during a study of asylum cases decided by
immigration judges from 1994 to 2005 that asylum seekers without representation
were denied asylum 93.4 percent of the time, while those with representation were
denied only 64 percent of the time).
107 Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)
(Supp. 1998).
108 Id.
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is represented by counsel.109  In EOIR immigration courts, approximately
two-thirds of asylum seekers are represented.110
The obstacles facing an asylum seeker filing an application pro se are
enormous.  An applicant must attempt to master a complex area of the
law and navigate a convoluted application process.111  The first step is to
complete the application for asylum (I-589 Application for Asylum or
Withholding), which is an incredibly dense and complicated 12-page doc-
ument with 11 pages of instructions.112  The USCIS Ombudsman, in his
2007 Annual Report, stated that “ [c]omprehending these instructions
requires at minimum a reading ability at a high level. . . . Even more
alarming is that Form I-589 specifically serves a population for whom
English may be the second language, as a lack of English language ability
is commonplace among asylum seekers.”113  In addition to asking for
extensive background information and the details of the persecution, the
application requires that applicants indicate the basis for their persecu-
tion.  This is a requirement that cannot be accurately addressed without
at least some understanding of asylum and refugee law.  In his 2007
report, the USCIS Ombudsman recommended that the I-589 be redrafted
“so that it is less complicated and more understandable by the intended
audience – persons who have been persecuted.”114
An application is more likely to be successful if supported by cor-
roborating evidence, including personal documentation and country con-
dition information.115  Obtaining personal documents, such as birth
109 Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 43, at 742. See also Robert A. Katzmann, R
The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 3, 7 (2008); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving
Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
55, 58 (Winter 2008)
110 Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 43, at 742 (noting that access to R
representation also varied depending on nationality and geographic location within
the United States).
111 See Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, MPI INSIGHT,
Apr. 2005, at 1, 2.
112 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
& U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, I-589
Application for Asylum and Withholding, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/
I-589.pdf.
113 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 102, at 95. R
114 Id.
115 A typical asylum application, as prepared by student attorneys at the
University of Baltimore Immigrant Rights Clinic, will contain an I-589 Application
for Asylum, an extremely detailed personal declaration, medical and psychological
evaluations, numerous personal documents with translations, and hundreds of pages
of country condition documentation with summaries.  Each application can take
several months to compile and hundreds of hours.
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certificates, marriage certificates, party membership cards, medical
records, requires that the applicant either have left his home country with
those documents, or is able to contact individuals in his home country
who can find the documents and send them to the United States.
Records such as arrest warrants or official government documents docu-
menting persecution may not exist, and even if they do, may be impossi-
ble to obtain without putting friends and family members at risk.116
Obtaining country condition information often requires access to a com-
puter and the internet.
Compounding the difficulty for applicants to prepare pro se applica-
tions is that applicants for asylum come from many different backgrounds
and cultures, with different customs and laws.  Applicants often do not
speak English,117 and some have very little education or even a basic level
of literacy.  Applicants may have no friends or family in the United States
who can help them.118  It is unreasonable to assume that asylum appli-
cants can successfully navigate the incredibly complex asylum system on
their own, given some of these constraints.
Yet the importance of representation at the earliest stages of an asylum
application cannot be underestimated.  Even if a claim is valid, an incom-
plete affirmative application, or one that contains even innocent errors,
can cause problems later during an asylum hearing before an immigration
judge.119  Incomplete or inaccurate applications have been used by immi-
gration judges to support findings of adverse credibility, ultimately lead-
ing to a denial of asylum.120
Unfortunately, many asylum seekers cannot afford representation.121
Those asylum-seekers who arrive with no money or resources must
devote their time to finding shelter, food, and basic social services.  This is
compounded by the fact that asylum seekers cannot obtain work authori-
zation until 180 days after filing an application for asylum.122  While some
116 See infra Section II (C)(2)(b) (The Real ID Act – Credibility and
Corroboration).
117 In 2007, a total of 265 different languages were spoken in court proceedings,
and only 14 percent of proceedings were conducted in English. FY 2007 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at F1. R
118 Indeed, as a result, some asylum seekers fall prey to notaries and other
unscrupulous parties that seek to exploit their vulnerabilities. See Katzmann, supra
note 109, at 8. R
119 Id. at 9.
120 Dong v. Ashcroft, 406 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the omission
of information that goes to the heart of an asylum claim can support an adverse
credibility finding.).
121 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 97; see also FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR R
BOOK, supra note 40, at G1 (“Many individuals in removal proceedings are indigent R
and cannot afford a private attorney.”).
122 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) (2008); Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (1998). See infra Part IV.A.
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free or low cost legal services for asylum seekers exist, the need for such
services is greater than the availability.123
C. Complex Asylum Law and Recent Legislative Obstacles To
Affirmative Asylum
Asylum law is increasingly complex.  While some of the laws that raise
bureaucratic obstacles to the granting of valid asylum claims were imple-
mented prior to 9/11, in the wake of 9/11, the law became increasingly
complicated and restrictive, leading to even greater uncertainty for asy-
lum–seekers.  As a result, asylum officers are now, more than ever, faced
with cutting-edge issues or fine points of law.  It stands to reason that
asylum officers, who are not judges, or even lawyers in many cases, will
choose to refer complicated questions of law to an immigration judge.
1. Legislative Obstacles to Affirmative Asylum Prior to September
11, 2001
In 1996, Congress implemented the Illegal Immigrant Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which introduced a number of
new restrictions on asylum seekers.124  Two of these restrictions, in partic-
ular the one-year filing deadline and the firm resettlement bar, have pre-
vented scores of affirmative asylum-seekers from having their cases
adjudicated on the merits by asylum officers.
(a) One-Year Bar
The IIRIRA introduced a new filing deadline for asylum applications
of one-year after an applicant’s last arrival in the United States, unless
the applicant can demonstrate that changed circumstances or extraordi-
nary circumstances exist that are related to the failure to file within one
year.125  This change was codified ostensibly to reduce fraud in the asy-
123 For a detailed overview of legal services available to asylum seekers, see
Katzmann, supra note 109. See also Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for R
Immigrants: What They Do, Why They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded,
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS No. 04-6, (June 2004) 1; Kerwin, supra note 111. R
124 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.104-208, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009.
125 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2), (4), and (5).  Changed circumstances “may include, but
are not limited to: [c]hanges in conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality
or . . . [c]hanges in the applicant’s circumstances that materially affect the applicant’s
eligibility for asylum . . . .”  8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B).  Extraordinary
circumstances “shall refer to events or factors directly related to the failure to meet
the 1-year deadline.”  Those circumstances may include serious illness, mental or
physical disability, legal disability such as being an unaccompanied minor, or the
death or serious illness of the applicant’s immediate family.  8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5).
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lum system,126 but in reality, it simply prevents many asylum seekers with
valid persecution claims from having their claims adjudicated on the
merits.
Preparing an application for asylum is an extremely complicated, time-
consuming process, with serious consequences attached to any errors.127
It is unreasonable to expect that every asylum seeker has the ability to
navigate the process and prepare an application within one year of arri-
val.  In fact, prior to the IIRIRA, many asylum seekers were not able to
apply within the first year.128  The one-year deadline makes no allowance
for the applicant who does not know about the deadline, which is
extremely problematic for those who have no familiarity with the U.S.
legal system or the asylum process.  Even those who do know that asylum
is available and that there is a deadline may be unable to find affordable
legal assistance and may find the difficulties in preparing an application
on their own insurmountable.129  The net effect of the one-year bar is to
make asylum unattainable for the most vulnerable of all protection seek-
ers: those who do not speak English, those who cannot read and write, or
those who have no friends or family to help guide them through the U.S.
asylum process.
The Asylum Officer Corps Basic Training Course Manual states that if
an exception to the one-year filing deadline applies, then “the applicant is
entitled to a full adjudication of the asylum application.”130  Also,
“[a]sylum offices must be flexible and inclusive in examining changed or
extraordinary circumstances, if credible testimony or documentary evi-
dence relating to an exception exists.”131  However, statistics published
by USCIS from 2000 to 2004 on the number of affirmative asylum appli-
cations that were referred to an immigration judge on the basis of having
been filed past the one-year deadline reveal a lack of such flexibility.
Those cases averaged slightly more than 30 percent of all of the cases that
asylum officers referred to an immigration judge,132 demonstrating that
126 See Susan S. Blum, Note & Comment, The Illegal Immigration  Reform &
Immigrant Responsibility Act’s One-Year Filing Deadline on Applications for Asylum:
The Narrow Interpretation and Application of Exceptions to the Filing Deadline, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2005).
127 See supra Section II.B.
128 See Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved
but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 9 (2001).
129 See supra Section II.B.
130 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
One-Year Filing Deadline at 8 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.rmscdenver.org/
documents/Oneyear14Sept06LP.pdf.
131 Id.
132 See 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 55; 2003 R
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 60; 2002 YEARBOOK OF R
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 53, at 69; 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE R
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 52, 102; 2000 STATISTICAL R
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the one-year bar is a significant obstacle to the success of an affirmative
application.
(b) Firm Resettlement
The definition of “firm resettlement” and its status as a mandatory bar
to asylum was codified in 1996 by the IIRIRA.133  A person is considered
to be firmly resettled if “prior to arrival in the United States, he or she
entered another country with, or while in that country received, an offer
of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of perma-
nent resettlement.”134  Like the one-year deadline, the firm resettlement
bar in the United States has been described by some commentators as “a
regulatory loophole by which the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice . . . attempts to remove refugees from otherwise valid persecution
claims.”135
To rebut a firm resettlement claim, an applicant must show that she was
in the country solely as a necessity for her onward flight and only as long
as necessary without establishing any ties; that she was not offered reset-
tlement; or that her movements were so restricted by the authority of the
country as to constitute non-resettlement.136  Some courts use a “totality
of circumstances” standard for determinations of firm resettlement,137
while other courts require that the government demonstrate that an offer
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 51, at R
100.
133 IIRIRA, supra note 124; 8 C.F.R. 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2008); 8 C.F.R. 208.15 R
(2008).  The 1951 Refugee Convention establishes the doctrine of firm resettlement
by excluding from the definition of a “refugee” any person who “has acquired a new
nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality.” U.N.
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, at art. I (C)(3).  However, when the United States R
codified the asylum process in 1980, firm resettlement was not a mandatory bar to a
grant of asylum, and it was not until 1990 that new federal regulations were
promulgated holding that firm resettlement was a mandatory ground for a denial of
asylum.  55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,678 (Jul. 27, 1990) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.89). See
also Sloane, supra note 11, at 53. R
134 8 C.F.R. 208.15 (2008).
135 See Sloane, supra note 11, at 47-48. R
136 “Factors that shall be considered include . . . the conditions under which other
residents of the country live; the type of housing, whether permanent or temporary,
made available to the refugee; the types and extent of employment available to the
refugee; and the extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property and
to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel documentation that includes a right
of entry or reentry, education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to
others resident in the country.” 8 C.F.R. 208.15 (a)-(b) (2008).
137 See Camposeco-Montejo v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 814, 818-21 (9th Cir. 2004).
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of firm resettlement was made before the burden shifts to the asylum
seeker to show that he or she was not firmly resettled.138
The Asylum Officer Corps Basic Training Course manual follows the
latter standard stating that “[t]he primary consideration in determining if
an applicant was firmly resettled is whether an offer of permanent resi-
dent status, citizenship or some other type of permanent resettlement was
made.”139  The Asylum Officer Corps Basic Training Course manual does
not adequately address the “totality of circumstances” standard, which
leaves a gap in the legal training given to asylum officers and creates an
uncertainty regarding the law that will be applied to an asylum seeker
with a potential firm resettlement issue.
2. Legislative Obstacles to Affirmative Asylum after September 11,
2001
Irresponsible judges have made asylum laws vulnerable to fraud and
abuse.  We will end judge-imposed presumptions that benefit sus-
pected terrorists in order to stop providing a safe haven to some of
the worst people on Earth [sic].  The REAL ID Act will reduce the
opportunity for immigration fraud so that we can protect honest asy-
lum-seekers and stop rewarding terrorists and criminals who falsely
claim persecution.
– Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.’s official statement on
the 2005 Real ID Act140
One of the United States’ responses to the 9/11 attacks was to initiate a
series of actions against non-citizens, including asylum seekers.  In the
months immediately following the attacks, the Government rounded up
and detained over 1,200 non-citizens, mostly Arab or Muslim men;141 sus-
pended all refugee resettlements for more than two months;142 and
passed the USA PATRIOT Act on October 25, 2001, which was aimed at
138 See Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F. 3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2004); Abdille v. Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477, 487-89 (3d Cir. 2001).
139 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion at 26 (December 5, 2002), http://www.rmsc
denver.org/aobtc/Bars5dec02lplinks.pdf (citing Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
140 151 CONG. REC. H545 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
141 See Eleanor Acer, Refuge in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11
United States, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1361, 1367 (2005) (citing OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
1 (2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf).
142 Id. at 1368-69.
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curbing terrorism, but had an impact on several immigration policies as
well.143
In 2002, the Bush Administration restructured the Federal Govern-
ment and transferred all of the functions of the INS, previously part of
the Department of Justice, to the newly created DHS.144  In 2003, the
Government initiated Operation Liberty Shield, whereby asylum seekers
from thirty-four Arab or Muslim nations were automatically detained
while their asylum cases were decided.145  In 2004, DHS expanded expe-
dited removal and in 2005, Congress passed the Real ID Act, which
included provisions that directly targeted asylum seekers.146
The war on terror has increased suspicion and distrust of asylum seek-
ers.  Some commentators have even suggested that terrorists would use
the asylum process to gain admission into the United States.147  However,
there is no real evidence that terrorists have tried to use the asylum pro-
cess.148  Nor does it make sense that they would want to; applying for
asylum is not only an extremely complicated and lengthy procedure, but
it involves multiple security checks, including fingerprinting, other bio-
metric verifications, and background checks.149
Nevertheless, because the substantive grounds for asylum are well
established,150 in the aftermath of 9/11 legislators sought increased
administrative and legislative means by which to permanently limit the
number of asylum seekers granted protection in the United States, all in
the name of increasing security.  Since 9/11, new legislation has broad-
143 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT ACT].
144 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441(2), 442(a)(3),
451(b), 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 6 U.S.C.  § § 251(2), 252(a)(3), 271(b)).
145 See Peter Schey, U.S. Immigration Policies and the War on Terrorism, L.A.
LAW., Sept. 2006, at 12, 17.  Operation Liberty Shield was terminated after little more
than a month in the wake of intense opposition from community groups. See Acer,
supra note 141, at 1379-82. R
146 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 [hereinafter REAL ID
ACT].
147 See, e.g., Price, supra note 15, at 414. R
148 See Editorial, National ID Party, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at A12 (“In the
past decade, perhaps a half-dozen individuals with some kind of terrorists ties have
applied for asylum.  All were rejected.”).
149 Id.; Patricia J. Freshwater, Note, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the
Torture of Its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 592-93 (2005).
150 In fact, courts in the last decade have expanded the substantive grounds for
asylum.  For example, in the last few years, courts have increasingly recognized
gender as a particular social group in certain circumstances, such as when an applicant
fears being forced to undergo female genital mutilation.  See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). See also Price, supra note 15, at 415. R
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ened the definition of “terrorist group” and “terrorist activities,” thereby
increasing the number of people who are inadmissible, and changed some
of the standards and requirements for establishing an asylum claim,
thereby increasing the level of proof required of asylum seekers.
(a) Material Support Bar
In determining who is eligible for asylum, an adjudicator must take into
account whether the asylum seeker is barred from admission on the
grounds of having engaged in terrorist activity.151  The USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001 and the Real ID Act of 2005 amended the INA by broaden-
ing the definition of “material support,” “terrorist,” and “terrorist organi-
zations,” and thereby greatly expanded the class of people who are now
inadmissible on this ground.  This expanded definition has put legitimate
refugees and asylum seekers at risk of being denied protection in the
United States.
Under the law as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Real
ID Act, a person is inadmissible if he or she ever engaged in “terrorist
activity”, which includes committing “an act that actor knows, or reasona-
bly should know, affords material support, including a safe house, trans-
portation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material
financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons. . .,
explosives, or training. . . to a terrorist organization. . . or to any member
of such an organization.”152  The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the defi-
nition of “terrorist organization” to include any group that used a
“weapon” other than for personal monetary gain.153  The Real ID Act
further expanded the definition to include any group that has a subgroup
that uses weapons.154  As a result, a group may be deemed to be a terror-
ist organization even if it has not been designated as a Tier I or Tier II
151 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)
(2006). The Immigration Act of 1990 was the first piece of legislation that explicitly
excluded persons on security-related grounds if they were engaged in “terrorist
activity.” Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; See Gregory
F. Laufer, Note, Admission Denied: In Support of a Duress Exception to the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s “Material Support for Terrorism” Provision, 20
GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 437, 438 (2006).  In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (ADEPA), which created a process whereby the
Department of State could designate certain organizations as foreign terrorist
organizations, and automatically bar members of those organizations from asylum.
ADEPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 503, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
152 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
153 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING
THE PERSECUTED: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND OPPRESSION BARRED FROM ASYLUM
3 (2006), available at www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.
pdf [hereinafter ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED].
154 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III); see ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra
note 153. R
\\server05\productn\B\BIN\27-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 30 23-APR-09 13:01
90 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:61
terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.155  Organizations
found to be terrorist organizations, but not designated as such by the
Department of State, are generally referred to as Tier III terrorist
organizations.156
The only defense afforded an applicant accused of engaging in a “ter-
rorist activity” is lack of knowledge if the applicant did not know, or
should not have reasonably known, that the person he or she was provid-
ing support to was a member of a terrorist organization or planned to
engage in terrorist activity.157  There is no exception to the material sup-
port bar if the support provided was minimal.158  There is no exception if
the group to which material support is given is a group that the United
States is sympathetic to, or if it is organized against an illegitimate repres-
sive government.159  Nor is there an exception if the “material support”
was many years ago and the applicant clearly no longer presents a threat
to the United States.160  Spouses and children of those found to have
given material support to terrorist organizations within the previous five
155 In accordance with section 219 of the INA, the U.S. Department of State has a
process for designating groups as terrorist organizations and maintains a list of these
organizations known as FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations).  8 U.S.C. § 1189
(a)(1). See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (2005),
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.  Under the U.S. PATRIOT Act, the U.S.
Department of State is also authorized to designate terrorist organization for
immigration purposes and keeps a list of such countries known as the Terrorist
Exclusion List; organizations so designated would fall under the definition of terrorist
organizations” in Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(III).
See U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Exclusion List, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/
32678.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). See also ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra
note 153. R
156 See Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., The Material Support Bar &
Applying For Immigration Benefits, available at http://www.cliniclegal.org/sites/
default/files/MaterialSupportFactSheet_April2008_final.pdf.
157 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
158 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); see In re S- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941-42,
945 (B.I.A. 2006) (“Congress has not expressly indicated its intent to provide an
exception for contributions which are de minimis.  Thus the DHS asserts that the term
‘material support’ is effectively a term of art and that all the listed types of assistance
are covered, irrespective of any showing that they are independently ‘material.’”);
Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that very modest
amounts of food and shelter did constitute “material support”).
159 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii); In re S- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at  941 (“[W]e find
that Congress intentionally drafted the terrorist bars to relief very broadly, to include
even those people described as ‘freedom fighters,’ and it did not intend to give us the
discretion to create exceptions for members of organizations to which our
government might be sympathetic. . . . Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, there
is no exception in the Act to the bar to relief in cases involving the use of justifiable
force to repel attacks by forces of an illegitimate regime.”)
160 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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years are also barred from asylum, regardless of whether or not they were
involved in the actions.161
Finally, under the Real ID Act as originally codified, there was no
exception to the material support bar if the applicant acted out of duress
or self-defense.162  Shortly after the enactment of the Real ID Act, judges
in the EOIR immigration court, the BIA, and Federal Circuit Courts
began to deny claims in which asylum applicants were forced to give sup-
port to terrorist organizations under duress.163  However, adjudicators
and others expressed grave concerns that, as a result of these provisions,
those most in need of protection were at risk of having their asylum appli-
cations denied.164
The law does provide that DHS can, in consultation with the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Department of State, waive the inadmissibility of
certain groups of refugees or asylum seekers under this bar, although
there is no process by which such an exemption can be requested.165  In
response to widespread concern, DHS used its discretionary authority to
slightly temper the material support provisions.  In 2006 and 2007, the
Department of State and DHS used this authority to waive inadmissibil-
ity for certain persons who supported the Chin National Front or the
Karen National Union.166
161 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IX).  An exception is provided for spouses and
children if they “did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity, or
if they “renounced the activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
162 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); see ASYLUM CASE LAW SOURCEBOOK, CASE
ABSTRACTS FOR U.S. COURT DECISIONS xxi (6th ed. 2006).
163 See, e.g., In re S- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 941; Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298 (3d Cir.
2004); McAllister v. Attorney Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2006).
164 For example, in a concurring opinion in McAllister, Third Circuit Judge Barry
wrote, “I refuse to believe that ‘Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free . . .’ is now an empty entreaty.  But if it is, shame on us. . . .
The problem here, though, is that Congress’s definition of ‘terrorist activity’ sweeps in
not only the big guy, but also the little guy who poses no risk to anyone.”  McAllister,
444 F.3d. at 191 (Barry, J., concurring).  In a concurring opinion in In re S- K-, BIA
Acting Vice Chairman Juan P. Osuna noted that “DHS conceded at oral argument
that an individual who assisted the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the
Taliban in the 1990’s would be considered to have provided ‘material assistance’ to a
terrorist organization under this statute and thus would be barred from asylum.” In re
S- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 948 (Osuna, concurring).
165 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B). See ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 153, R
at 5.
166 In 2006, DOS applied the waiver to refugees from Burma who had supported
the Chin National Front or Chin National Army.  See Press Release, State
Department Office of the Spokesman, The Department of State Decides Material
Support Inapplicable to Chin Refugees from Burma (Oct. 19, 2006), available at http:/
/www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/74761.htm.  In 2007, DHS applied the waiver to
persons who had supported the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation
Army, the Chin National Front/Chin National Army, the Chin National League for
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In 2007, DHS exercised its discretionary authority to exempt from the
material support bar certain individuals who provided material support
under duress to two Columbian Tier II terrorist organizations: the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Libera-
tion Army of Colombia (ELN).167  DHS also exercised its authority to
hold that the persons who provided material support under duress to a
Tier III organization may be eligible for a waiver to the bar if warranted
by the totality of the circumstances.168
In 2008, the Consolidated Appropriations Act significantly broadened
the waiver authority of the Department of State and DHS over terrorism-
related grounds for inadmissibility for any alien and amended the INA to
permit immigration authorities to waive the “terrorist organization” defi-
nition of a non-designated group as long as it did not engage in terrorist
activity against the United States or other democratic country, or engage
in a pattern of terroristic activities against civilians.  It also specifically
designated ten groups as not being “terrorist organizations.”169  On July
1, 2008, former President Bush signed into a law a provision that specifi-
cally exempted the ANC from treatment as a terrorist organization and
provided DHS with the authority to determine that the material support
bar not apply to persons with respect to activities undertaken in associa-
tion with the ANC in opposition to the South African apartheid rule.170
For all other groups, however, the decision regarding whether or not
Democracy, the Kayan New Land Party, the Arakan Liberation Party, the Tibetan
Mustangs, the Cuban Alzados, the Karenni National Progressive Party. See Press
Release, Statement from Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary on the
Intention to Use Discretionary Authority for Material Support to Terrorism (Jan. 19,
2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1169465766808.shtm.
167 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS
Implements Authority to Exempt Certain Persons Who Provided Material Support
Under Duress to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Sept. 26,
2007), available at www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/MaterialSupportFS_26Sep07.pdf;
Authorization Document from Paul S. Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security, to Emilio Gonzalez, Director, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/
nativedocuments/ELN_Auth_18Dec07.pdf.
168 Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958 (Mar. 6, 2007).
169 Pub. L. No. 110-257, Div. J. § 691(a).  The ten groups that are not considered
“terrorist organizations” are the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation
Army, the Chin National Front/Chin National Army, the Chin National League for
Democracy, the Kayan New Land Party, the Arakan Liberation Party, the Tibetan
Mustangs, the Cuban Alzados, the Karenni National Progressive Party, appropriate
groups affiliated with the Hmong, and appropriate groups affiliated with the
Montagnards.  Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. J. § 691(b). See also Garcia & Wasem, supra
note 23, at 7-8. R
170 Removing the African National Congress from Treatment as a Terrorist
Organization, Pub. L. No. 110-257, 122 Stat. 2426 (2008).  Prior to the enactment of
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those groups qualify as a “non-designated” terrorist group, and whether
that group then qualifies for a waiver, is thus generally left to the immi-
gration adjudicator.
Following the enactment of the Real ID Act, and prior to the exercise
of its waiver authority, DHS placed more than 500 asylum cases with
material support issues on hold indefinitely.171  USCIS is currently
reviewing some cases involving material support issues for which a waiver
may be available, as well as some cases that were denied after December
26, 2007 on the basis of the material support bar.172  Nevertheless, some
asylum applicants, often the most vulnerable, remain at risk because of
the material support provisions, since not every applicant is covered by
the current waiver authority.  Those that may be eligible for a waiver
must now wait for their cases to be reviewed by USCIS, thus prolonging
their asylum application process.
(b) Real ID Act – Credibility and Corroboration
The Real ID Act also changed the credibility and corroboration stan-
dards applicable in asylum cases, and did so not to the benefit of an asy-
lum seeker.  Under the Real ID act, when determining credibility, an
adjudicator can take into account the “totality of circumstances and all
relevant factors,” which can include “demeanor, candor, or responsive-
ness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the appli-
cant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or
witness’s written and oral statements . . . with other evidence of record . . .
and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to
whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”173  This is a significant
change; in the past, courts have held that inconsistencies in an applicant’s
testimony or application must be material or go to the heart of the
claim.174  Now, any inconsistency, no matter how insignificant or tangen-
tial, may result in a finding of incredibility.
this law, if Nelson Mandela were to have applied for asylum during apartheid, he
would have been barred had the material support provisions been in effect.
171 See Melanie Nezer, The “Material Support” Problem: An Uncertain Future for
Thousands of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, BENDERS’S IMMIGR. BULL., at 2 (Dec. 15,
2005). See also Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., supra note 156. See also R
ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 153. R
172 Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., supra note 156. R
173 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158
(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
174 See Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Minor
inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged
fear of persecution, go to the heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an
asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility
finding.”).
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Even more disturbing is that the Real ID Act allows an immigration
judge to deny asylum based on an applicant’s demeanor.  Allowing a
judge to base a finding on credibility on an applicant’s demeanor reflects
a gross ignorance of the cultural norms of some applicants.  Karen,175 an
asylee from Guinea, describes the difficulty is this way:
The hardest for me, was to learn to look the [asylum] officer in his
eyes.  The first thing is that when you are speaking to a person higher
than you – their social position, age, or importance – you must keep
your head and eyes down.  The second thing is that a woman talking
to a man does not look him in the eyes, unless he is very close, fam-
ily.  No one looks a stranger in the eye – to do so shows you have no
respect and that you are better than him or her, it is like issuing a
challenge.  Also, in our culture, when you are with a stranger, you
cannot talk about your life – that is giving away your private parts.
With a stranger, there is no trust, and we are taught to ask “will he
repeat what I say to another?”  You also worry that the stranger will
mock you if you tell them the private parts of your life.176
Without assistance, asylum-seekers in Karen’s position could find their
claim denied because of their demeanor when appearing before an asy-
lum officer or a judge.
The Real ID Act also allows an immigration judge to demand cor-
roborating evidence and to deny a claim if such evidence is not pro-
vided.177  The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient by itself, but
“only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testi-
mony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”178  However, even under
those circumstances the judge can require corroborating evidence,
“unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably
obtain the evidence.”179
This corroboration requirement can be an insurmountable obstacle for
some asylum seekers.  Some countries lack a developed infrastructure or
a centralized bureaucracy, while others lack a functioning government at
all.  In rural areas in particular, identity documents are not often availa-
ble, and even if they are, they are not regularly used in communities with
high rates of illiteracy.180  In addition, many people do not have the time
175 Not her real name.
176 Interview with “Karen,” in Tucson, Ariz. (Oct. 11, 2006) (notes on file with
author).
177 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(ii).
178 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(ii).
179 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(ii). See also In re J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 263
(B.I.A. 2007); In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 2007); Chukwu v.
Attorney Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2007).
180 Karen, an educated professional, had the foresight to bring many documents
with her when she fled her country.  She notes, however, that many people in her
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or the ability to collect what documents they do have when they flee the
country or they may choose not to carry them due to fear that they will be
identified while trying to leave.  Furthermore, many repressive govern-
ments never generate any record of arrests, detentions, or even trials; in
such countries secrecy is fundamental to maintaining a climate of fear and
preserving impunity for its official actors.  People fleeing from repressive
governments, therefore, often do not have documentation of their abuse.
Nonetheless, the guidance provided by the Asylum Officer Corps Basic
Training Course Manual regarding what type of corroborating evidence
should be provided does not fully recognize these realities.  The Asylum
Officer Corps Basic Training Course Manual specifically cites to language
from a BIA case, Matter of S-M-J-181, stating that requested evidence
“should provide documentary support for material facts which are central
to [the] claim and easily subject to verification, such as evidence of his or
her place of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, evidence of
publicly held office, or documentation of medical treatment.”182  In addi-
tion, “specific documentary corroboration of an applicant’s particular
experiences is not required unless the supporting documentation is of the
type that would normally be created or available in the particular country
and is accessible to the [applicant], such as through friends, relatives, or
co-workers.”183  This guidance fails to take into account how difficult it
can be for some asylum applicants to gather information, and if an appli-
cant fails to convince an asylum officer of the impossibility of getting cor-
roborating documents, he or she may not be granted asylum as a result.
Another disturbing development is that under the Real ID Act, asylum
adjudicators are advised that a review of country condition information
must include the U.S. Department of State Annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (DOS Human Rights Reports).184  Asylum
officers and immigration judges have always given a high level of defer-
ence to DOS Human Rights Reports, but now that deference is codi-
country do not read or write and as a result do not have papers, or, if they do, they do
not know what they are for.  Interview with “Karen,” supra note 176.  Karen also R
noted this system for giving birth certificates has led to problems for school children.
State schools require a birth certificate on file for all students, and thus, many
impoverished children are unable to attend school.
181 When establishing the new corroboration standards, Congress indicated that
the “provision is based upon the standard set forth in the BIA’s decision in Matter of
S-M-J.” Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course,
Lesson: Eligibility Part IV: Burden of Proof 22 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.
rmscdenver.org/aobtc/BurdenofProofStandardsofProofandEvidence.pdf.(citing to
H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 166 (2005) (Conf. Rep.)).
182 Id. (citing In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997)).
183 In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec., at 726.
184 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302-03 (2005) (amending 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
\\server05\productn\B\BIN\27-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 36 23-APR-09 13:01
96 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:61
fied.185  However, several scholars have noted that the DOS Human
Rights Reports cannot be considered an unbiased qualitative source of
information, but rather that they have an inherent foreign policy bias.186
Further, it is problematic to require that DOS Human Rights Reports be
a primary source of evidence for an asylum applicant, because there is no
meaningful opportunity for the applicant to cross-examine the anony-
mous authors or to question how the reports are drafted.187  As a result,
applicants whose persecution is of a type not described, or differently
described, in the reports may face a much higher obstacle in corroborat-
ing their claims and proving their credibility.
The Department of State is also responsible for providing advisory
opinions to asylum officers and immigration judges through written opin-
ions, profiles on country conditions,188 or cables from individual embas-
sies.  DOS has increasingly offered comments on the level of fraud in
asylum cases from certain countries.189  This is also problematic.  First,
while there may be high levels of fraud in documentation or otherwise
185 See Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on
America’s Asylum System, 2 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4 (2007); see also Niam v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that there is “chronic overreliance
on [State Department] reports” in immigration courts).
186 See id. at 6; see generally Jordan Kevin Cameron, Creating a Refuge Within the
United States: Correcting the Problems of the Asylum Applicant’s Hybrid Burden of
Proof, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1171 (2007) .
187 See Niam, 354 F.3d at 658 (“[T]he authors of these reports are anonymous and
there is no opportunity for the asylum-seeker to cross-examine any of them.”).
188 Profiles on Asylum Claims and Country Conditions are prepared by Office of
Country Reports an Asylum Affairs.  Three of the very few publicly available and
recently written profiles are from China in 2004, Albania in 2004, and El Salvador in
2003. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR,
CHINA: PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS (2004), available at
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/showDocument.cfm?documentID=5394 (which
discusses fraud in population control-based asylum claims); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, ALBANIA: PROFILE OF
ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS (2004), available at http://www.asylum
law.org/docs/showDocument.cfm?documentID=3623; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, EL SALVADOR: PROFILE OF ASYLUM
CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS (2003), available at  http://www.asylumlaw.org/
docs/showDocument.cfm?documentID=1229.
189 For example, the US Embassy in Yaounde´, Cameroon sent the Department of
State two cables, one in 2004 and one in 2007, both of which detail widespread fraud
in Cameroonian asylum claims and documentary evidence, without more than briefly
acknowledging the extremely poor human rights situation in the country that supports
claims of asylum. Diane Uchimiya,  A Blackstone’s Ratio for Asylum: Fighting Fraud
While Preserving Procedural Due Process for Asylum Seekers, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L.
REV. 383, 410 (2007) (citing to a cable from Niels Marquardt, U.S. Ambassador to
Cameroon, November 2004, and a cable from Richard W. Nelson, Charge´ d’Affaires
at the U.S. Embassy in Cameroon, April 2007).
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from a particular country, this does not mean that a particular applicant
appearing before an adjudicator is participating in that fraud.  Second, as
with the DOS Human Rights Reports, there is no means for applicants to
cross-examine or otherwise defend themselves from the generalities of
these often anonymous opinions and profiles.190  Yet, these opinions from
the Department of State are taken very seriously by adjudicators, and
have the potential of contributing to either increased demands for cor-
roborating evidence, or to presumptions of fraud and adverse credibility
determinations.191  As a result, in practice, applicants from countries hav-
ing a high level of fraud have to meet a higher burden of proof to show
that they, themselves, are credible.192
(c) The Real ID Act “One Central Reason” Requirement
The Real ID Act further amended the INA by now requiring the appli-
cant to establish that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.”193  In the past, courts have followed
a “mixed motive” standard, holding that persecution must simply relate
to one of the five grounds, not that it was a central reason.194  It is unclear
if this mixed motive standard can survive under the new statutory
language.
The guidance in the Asylum Officer Corps Basic Training Course Man-
ual provides that the applicant must establish facts on which a reasonable
person would fear that at least one central reason for the persecution was,
or would be, the protected characteristic, which cannot be tangential or
incidental to the persecutor’s motivation.195  However, conflicts often
have many underlying causes and can include ethnic or religious tensions,
190 See id. at 402 (citing Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft,  325 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2003), which
held that a letter from a letter from the Director of the Office of Country Reports and
Asylum Affairs regarding the results of an investigation in documentary fraud by a
US embassy violated due process because the letter contained hearsay).
191 See id. at 384-85.
192 See id. at 423.
193 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2006).
194 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (The BIA held “to be a
basis for a grant of asylum, persecution must relate to . . . one of the five categories
described in section 101 (a)(42)(A) of the Act”).  See Rodriguez Morales v. Attorney
Gen., 488 F.3d 884, 888 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting the inherent difficulties an applicant
faces in providing direct evidence of the motives of their persecutor, and ruling that
an applicant need only provide enough evidence “from which it is reasonable to
conclude that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed
political opinion”).
195 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
Asylum Eligibility Part III: Nexus and the Five Protected Characteristics 71 (Jan. 23,
2007), available at http://www.rmscdenver.org/aobtc/NexusandtheFiveProtectedChar.
pdf (citing Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988); In re S-P-, 21 I.
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political persecution, or simply a fight for control over natural resources.
In many countries, ethnicity and political opinion overlap.  In such cases,
a person’s ethnicity may be sufficient for finding that the government
targeted that person on the basis of an imputed political opinion.  In
other cases, it may be impossible to determine if a person was targeted
for persecution on one of the five grounds, or was simply caught up in an
ethnic or political conflict, but not specifically targeted.  This is simply
one more area of asylum law that has become increasingly complex and
difficult for adjudicators to navigate.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF A PROLONGED PROCESS FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM SEEKERS
One of our prime responsibilities in our endeavor to protect refugees
is to adjudicate applications filed affirmatively with CIS . . . .  The
ultimate consequence of [a backlog in pending applications] is that
genuine refugees do not receive timely protection and therefore can-
not be promptly reunited with their immediate family members who
may still be in danger.
– Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Manual196
Mr. O197, a native of a small country in central Africa, arrived in the
United States in 1997 on a valid tourist visa.  Mr. O was fleeing govern-
ment genocide against his ethnic group and, prior to his escape, was
repeatedly detained and severely tortured.  Mr. O was forced to leave
behind his wife and two young children, who went into hiding in a neigh-
boring state.  Shortly after arriving in the United States, Mr. O was hospi-
talized due to problems with his heart and pancreas.  In 1999, Mr. O
received the devastating news that his wife had died and his children were
hiding in Cameroon with distant relatives.  Distraught, Mr. O entered
into a period of severe depression that rendered him incapable of partici-
pating in day-to-day activities.  He was later diagnosed as suffering from
severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.  In 2000, doctors
performed an emergency appendectomy on Mr. O.  Mr. O requested and
received one extension to his tourist visa based on his medical condition,
but was denied a second extension.
After he recovered from the appendectomy, Mr. O immediately began
seeking legal representation to pursue an asylum claim.  He contacted
several legal organizations and, in early 2001, his case was taken by the
only organization in Arizona that provided free representation to non-
& N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996)); Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 479-82 (1992); H.R. REP. NO. 109-72 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
196 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
Corps Values and Goals, supra note 99, at 12. R
197 Mr. O is a former client of the author.
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detained asylum seekers at that time.  This local NGO filed an affirmative
political asylum claim on behalf of Mr. O within two months.
Because he resided in Arizona, Mr. O had to wait until an asylum
officer from the Los Angeles asylum office came to Phoenix to interview
him.  Mr. O was not scheduled for an asylum interview until late 2005,
four years after filing his application.  Mr. O did not receive a decision in
his case for nine months, at which time the asylum officer referred him to
an immigration judge because he had missed the one-year deadline
despite his extraordinary circumstances.  Mr. O’s merits hearing was post-
poned twice by DHS, and his case was not heard by the immigration
judge until September 2005, a full year after his case had been referred.
The immigration judge granted asylum and noted that Mr. O had the
strongest exception to the one-year bar that the judge had ever adjudi-
cated.  Unfortunately, DHS appealed the decision, and Mr. O had to wait
almost two more years until the summer of 2007 before he received his
final grant of asylum.  During this time, Mr. O’s children remained in
hiding in Africa because, under the law, Mr. O could not apply to have
them join him until he received his final grant of asylum.  Mr. O is still
waiting for USCIS to approve his application to bring his children to the
United States.
Unfortunately, Mr. O’s case is not unique.  Once an application is
affirmatively filed for asylum, the asylum seeker must wait for an inter-
view, which, by law, is supposed to take place within 45 days.198  Asylum
applicants who reside far away from one of the eight local asylum offices
are interviewed during “circuit rides,” whereby asylum officers travel to
USCIS District and Sub Offices for interviews.199  A significant percent-
age of asylum applicants, more than 50 percent in some asylum offices,
are interviewed via circuit rides.200  DHS has noted that applicants inter-
viewed during circuit rides are more likely to not have their case adjudi-
cated within the legislative timeline because of the infrequency in which
circuit rides are scheduled.201
198 “[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, the initial interview or hearing
on the asylum application shall commence not later than 45 days after the date an
application is filed.”  Immigration and Nationality Act, 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2006).
199 Notice of Circuit Ride Location Changed for the Chicago and Houston Asylum
Offices, 69 Fed. Reg. 17437 (Apr. 2004). See supra Part II.B.1.
200 In 2004, more than fifty percent of the applications received at the Houston
Asylum Office and the Chicago Asylum Office were from individuals who had to be
interviewed during Circuit Rides.  Between five and twenty percent of the
applications received at the five other asylum offices were from individuals that had
to be interviewed during circuit rides. Notice of Circuit Ride Location Changed for
the Chicago and Houston Asylum Offices, 69 Fed. Reg. at 17437.
201 Id. (DHS also noted that interviews at circuit ride locations are less efficient
and that asylum officers do not have access to the same decision-making tools
available in the asylum office).
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Once an interview has been conducted, the applicant must wait for a
decision.202  If referred to an immigration judge, the applicant then must
then wait for a master calendar hearing and then wait for a merits hear-
ing.  Again, depending on the docket of a particular immigration court, a
merits hearing might not be scheduled for many months.  Once the hear-
ing has taken place, if the immigration judge does not immediately decide
the case, the applicant must await a written decision or return to court at
a later date to hear the decision.  While under law this process is sup-
posed to take place within 180 days,203 in practice, for some asylum seek-
ers the process may take years.
Since the USCIS asylum grant rate dropped after 9/11, a greater per-
centage of affirmative asylum applicants are being referred by USCIS
asylum officers to an immigration judges and, as a result, see their cases
prolonged.  This is particularly troublesome given that in 2007, 51 percent
of all affirmative asylum cases referred by the USCIS were cases in which
an immigration judge ultimately granted asylum.204  In other words,
slightly more than half of all affirmative asylum seekers referred to immi-
gration judges have valid asylum claims, but have to expend significant
additional time and resources before they are recognized as bona fide
refugees and granted protection accordingly.  In turn, this means that a
greater proportion of legitimate asylum seekers must face the detrimental
impact of a prolonged asylum process.
202 The Asylum Officer Corps operates under the guidelines that 75% of all cases
are completed, including being referred to an immigration judge if applicable, within
sixty days of receipt. However, that means that up to 25% of cases may not be
adjudicated within those guidelines, and consequently within the required 180 day
adjudication guidelines.  Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic
Training Course, Lesson: Corps Values and Goals, supra note 61, at 8, 10.
203 “[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative
adjudication of the asylum application, not including administrative appeal, shall be
completed within 180 days after the date an application is filed.”  8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
204 See infra Table 4: EOIR Affirmative and Defensive Grant Rates.
\\server05\productn\B\BIN\27-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 41 23-APR-09 13:01
2009] AFFIRMATIVELY DENIED 101
TABLE 4: EOIR AFFIRMATIVE AND DEFENSIVE GRANT RATES205
Affirmative Grant Rate Defensive Grant Rate
FY 01 44% 33%
FY 02 44% 28%
FY 03 44% 26%
FY 04 45% 26%
FY 05 44% 28%
FY 06 51% 34%
FY 07 51% 39%
A. Inability to Work
Mr. O was fortunate because he was able to work for most of the time
that it took to adjudicate his asylum claim.  When an asylum seeker files
an asylum application, a clock begins to run that documents the days that
have passed in the adjudication of the case.  Asylum seekers may not
apply for work authorization until 150 days have passed from the date the
application was filed, and work authorization will only be granted if there
is not a final determination on their case within 180 days.206  All asylum
seekers are thus unable to work until their case has been adjudicated, or
180 days have passed, whichever occurs first.
However, some asylum applicants are unable to work at all during their
asylum process.  If a delay occurs in the course of adjudication and it is
determined to be caused by the asylum seeker, then the clock is
stopped.207  Thus, clocks are stopped if asylum applicants request that an
asylum interview be rescheduled, or if they request a continuance in their
master calendar or merits hearing for any reason, including the need for
additional time to find a lawyer, or to obtain additional evidence.  How-
ever, immigration practitioners report that some clocks are erroneously
stopped, or even reset, through no fault of the applicant.208  Once
stopped, it can be very difficult, if not impossible, to restart a clock.209
205 The grant rate is calculated as the number of cases granted divided by the
number of cases decided on the merits (i.e. cases granted, conditionally granted, or
denied).  Statistics compiled from FY 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 74, R
at K3 (FY 01-FY02); FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 40, at K3 (FY 03- R
FY07).
206 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (Dec. 5, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (d)(2)).
207 8 C.F.R.§ 208.7(a)(2) (2008).
208 Discussion facilitated by Socheat Chea, Karen T. Grisez, Regina Germain and
David Stoller at American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) Annual
Conference, Breakfast With The Experts: Asylum Clock Issues (June 28, 2008).
209 Id.
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Because of these regulations, all asylum seekers must either have the
means to support themselves without working for up to 180 days while
their case is processed, or be forced to rely on friends and family for sup-
port.  For those asylum seekers whose clocks are stopped, they must wait
sometimes indefinitely before they become eligible for work authoriza-
tion.  In the worst case situation, asylum seekers remain destitute and
homeless while awaiting adjudication of their application.
B. Compromised Safety of Family Members
Many asylum seekers are forced to leave behind family members when
they flee their country.  Upon being granted asylum, an asylee may peti-
tion to bring his spouse and children over immediately as derivative
asylees; however, the asylee must wait until he has received a final grant
of asylum, and all appeals that DHS filed have been adjudicated.210  The
longer that an asylum case takes to adjudicate, the longer family mem-
bers are separated.  In Mr. O’s case, it has been more than 10 years since
he has seen his children.
Unfortunately, in many asylum cases, family members remaining in
their home country are in danger themselves, either on independent
grounds or because of their relationship to the asylum seeker.  Further-
more, given the requirements that applicants need to meet to obtain a
nonimmigrant visa, it is unlikely that family members will be able to join
the asylum seeker in the United States if the consular office is aware that
a family member has filed an asylum application.211
C. Prolonged Trauma and Stress
Uncertain immigration status in the country of a refugee can be very
stressful for a survivor [of torture] and can add greatly to his or her
feeling of instability and uncertainty.  The survivor may fear being
deported and returned to the country where the abuse occurred.
Waiting for a decision on a request for asylum can be very stressful;
being denied asylum can have [a] profound negative effect on a
survivor.
–  Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Manual212
Many asylum seekers are the survivors of torture or other extreme
trauma, and a prolonged asylum process can exacerbate this trauma.  An
estimated five to thirty percent of refugees have suffered torture, and
210 See USCIS Form I-730 Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition, available at http://
www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-730.pdf
211 See supra Part II.A.
212 Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Lesson:
Interviewing Part V – Interviewing Survivors at 13 (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://
www.rmscdenver.org/aobtc/Intv5survivorsdec02lp.pdf.
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those most likely to have a history of torture include asylum seekers.213
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression are common out-
ward manifestations of trauma or torture exhibited by asylum seekers.
However, an asylum seeker also faces unique stressors related to her
uncertain immigration status and fears of being ultimately returned to a
country where she will face further abuse.214
For an asylum seeker, the stress and instability of an uncertain future is
often compounded by separation from family and friends, and the lack of
a support system in the United States.215  This is particularly true for asy-
lum seekers who fear for the safety of family members who are left
behind in their home countries.  For those unable to work legally, unem-
ployment and the resultant inability to support themselves or their family
members is yet another stressor.216  The longer the applicant must wait to
be granted asylum and the safety and stability such a decision offers, the
greater the amount of trauma and stress that applicant will suffer.  With-
out a doubt, a denial of asylum at any stage of the process can be devas-
tating to an asylum seeker, regardless of whether to not he ultimately
succeeds in his claim.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that an affirmative asylum seeker with a legitimate claim
whose asylum process is prolonged because she is referred to an immigra-
tion judge suffers a tremendous cost.  However, it is not just the asylum
213 Linda Piwowarczyk, Seeking Asylum: A Mental Health Perspective, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 155, 155 (2001) (citing Ron Baker, Psychosocial Consequences for
Tortured Refugees Seeking Asylum and Refugee Status in Europe, in TORTURE AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT TREATMENT APPROACHES 82 (Metin Basoglu ed.,
1992) (“In the life of a refugee, the experience of trauma is persuasive – from
unplanned departures, family separations, extreme violence and loss to perils
associated with flight and potential exposure to atrocities beyond the capacity of
understanding.”).
214 Id. at 161-62 (citing to  Derrick Silove et al., Trauma Exposure, Postmigration
Stressors, and Symptoms of Anxiety, Depression, and Post-Migration Stress in Tamil
Asylum Seekers: Comparison with Refugees and Immigrants, 97 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 175 (1998) (“[W]ork comparing refugees and
asylees . . . revealed higher postmigration stress in asylees related to their insecure
residency status.”)).
215 See id. at 161; see also Sana Loue, Immigrant Access to Health Care and Public
Health: An International Perspective, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 213, 220 (2008).
216 Piwowarczyk, supra note 174, at 161 (citing Michael Frese & Gisela Mohr,
Prolonged Unemployment and Depression in Older Workers: A Longitudinal Study of
Intervening Variables, 25 SOC. SCI. & MED. 173 (1987) (“Prolonged unemployment
and repeated unemployment have been shown to lead to depression, reduced hope,
and financial problems.”)). See also Loue, supra note 176, at 220 (citing Manuel
Carballo & Aditi Nerukar, Migration, Refugees, and Health Risks, 7 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 556 (2001)).
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seeker that suffers a cost.  When an asylum case is referred to an immi-
gration judge for a de novo hearing, the U.S. Government faces addi-
tional operating and personnel costs, both within the Department of
Justice, which adjudicates the case, and the DHS, which represents the
government’s interests in immigration court proceedings.
There is a societal cost involved with a prolonged asylum process as
well.  Asylum seekers who are unable to work for 180 days, or in some
cases longer, are not contributing to the overall economic well-being of
American society, either through their work or through taxes.  There are
also significant community health risks if communicable diseases go
untreated because of an asylum seeker’s lack of access to health care or
insurance.217  Untreated illnesses may ultimately lead to higher health-
care costs later, or to decreased work productivity once status is
obtained.218
While these costs to the United States offer a practical motivation to
address the affirmative asylum process, the affirmative asylum process
must be repaired in order for the United States to truly meet its interna-
tional obligations to protection seekers.  While the creation of the asylum
officer corps was a tremendous step towards creating an efficient affirma-
tive asylum process, it is no longer functioning as it should.  It is simply
not acceptable that 51 percent of the cases that USCIS refers to immigra-
tion judges are ultimately found to be valid claims for protection.219  In
other words, the USCIS asylum officer corps has an error rate of over 50
percent in those cases that they refer to immigration judges.  Asylum
officers should be capable, in most cases, of granting asylum to deserving
protection seekers when those asylum seekers appear before them.
It is true that immigration law, particularly asylum law, has undergone
significant changes since 9/11, most particularly with the passage of the
Real ID Act.220  These changes place a higher burden on the asylum
seeker trying to prove that he is a bona fide refugee.  These changes also
make the decision-making process more complicated for adjudicators at
all levels of the asylum process.  However, the asylum officer corps, in
particular, is operating under conditions that make it difficult, if not
impossible, to adjudicate cases equitably.
First, the asylum officer corps does not have adequate personnel or
resources, and thus asylum officers do not have enough time to devote to
each individual case.221  Given the changes in asylum and immigration
law that have occurred since 9/11, and the lack of access to lawyers for
many asylum seekers, it is more important than ever that asylum officers
217 Loue, supra note 176, at 225 (citing Leighton Ku & Sheetal Matani, Left Out:
Immigrants’ Access to Health Care and Insurance, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 247 (2001)).
218 Id.
219 See supra Table 4: EOIR Affirmative and Defensive Grant Rates.
220 See supra Part III.C.2.
221 See supra Part III.A.
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have the time and the tools they need to thoroughly and competently
adjudicate each claim.  The asylum officer corps needs more officers, and
more support and research staff, so that each asylum officer can dedicate
adequate time to each asylum case.
Second, it is problematic that only some asylum officers hold a law
degree.222  It is true that asylum officers must undergo initial and continu-
ing training in asylum law; however, they are also expected to make life
and death legal decisions in a highly complicated area of the law.  It is
unreasonable to expect that asylum officers can do so, even with special-
ized training, without an educational background that is appropriate for
their decision-making authority.  The hiring requirements for asylum
officers should be amended to require a law degree, as well as some expe-
rience in immigration law.
Affirmative asylum seekers with valid claims should be granted asylum
at the first step in their asylum process, otherwise the cost to both the
asylum seeker and the United States is too high.  While the recommenda-
tions in this article offer only a partial solution to the problem, they are
an important step towards reestablishing an effective and equitable asy-
lum officer corps, a step which is necessary if the United States is to more
satisfactorily meet its international obligations towards protection
seekers.
222 See supra Part III.A.
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APPENDIX A:
USCIS ASYLUM CASES FILED OR REOPENED BY REGION
TABLE 1: USCIS ASYLUM CASES FILED OR REOPENED BY REGION223
1998224 1999225 2000226 2001227 2002228 2003229 2004230 2005231 2006232 2007233
Africa (Sub-
Saharan) 8,645 9,191 9,988 10,915 10,791 9,303 7,064 5,260 4,564 4,787
East Asia &
the Pacific 7,342 8,439 8,552 12,634 13,983 8,864 4,328 4,691 6,496 7,804
Europe &
Eurasia 5,268 5,549 6,175 7,262 6,021 4,425 3,477 2,841 2,540 2,330
Near East &
North Africa 2,502 1,927 2,248 2,510 2,606 1,569 876 899 1,163 1,256
Other234 292 229 269 309 407 132 356 350 197 330
South &
Central Asia 5,084 3,244 3,011 3,648 4,079 3,122 1,798 1,563 1,594 1,753
Western
Hemisphere 26,324 13,633 16,553 25,952 25,630 18,332 14,539 14,148 17,325 13,953
TOTAL235 55,428 42,207 46,776 63,230 63,427 46,272 32,682 29,752 33,879 32,213
223 For the purposes of this article, geographic regions were determined in
accordance with the manner in which the U.S. Department of State defines
geographic regions. See U.S. Department of State, Index: 2007 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007 (last visited Mar. 4,
2009).
224 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICES, supra note 49, at 102. R
225 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 50, at 100. R
226 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 51, at 100. R
227 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 52, at 102 R
228 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 53, at 69. R
229 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 60. R
230 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 55. R
231 Armstrong email, supra note 56. R
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Includes “no nationality,” “stateless,” and “unknown nationality.”
235 For some years, the sum totals of the regional totals differ slightly from the
total number of applications received as reported in the DHS Statistical Yearbooks.
It is unclear why these slight differences exist, but they are not significant statistically.
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FIGURE 1: USCIS ASYLUM CASES FILED OR REOPENED BY REGION
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APPENDIX B:
USCIS ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION
TABLE 1: USCIS ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION236
1998237 1999238 2000239 2001240 2002241 2003242 2004243 2005244 2006245 2007246
Africa (Sub-
Saharan) 48% 61% 61% 56% 48% 39% 39% 35% 38% 42%
East Asia &
the Pacific 18% 38% 48% 55% 46% 28% 26% 38% 35% 30%
Europe &
Eurasia 35% 44% 46% 45% 34% 32% 29% 27% 30% 37%
Near East &
North Africa 49% 59% 62% 65% 49% 41% 44% 41% 48% 56%
Other247 14% 29% 26% 28% 25% 11% 11% 8% 14% 11%
South &
Central Asia 19% 32% 49% 55% 47% 33% 36% 22% 39% 38%
Western
Hemi-sphere 9% 14% 21% 24% 17% 22% 30% 31% 26% 17%
236 The asylum grant rate is calculated as the number of cases granted divided by
the number of cases decided on the merits, i.e. cases granted, denied, or referred to an
Immigration Judge after an interview or because of a filing deadline issue.
237 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICES, supra note 49, at 102. R
238 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 50, at 100. R
239 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 51, at 100. R
240 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, supra note 52, at 102. R
241 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 53, at 69. R
242 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 60. R
243 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 55. R
244 Armstrong email, supra note 56. R
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Includes “no nationality,” “stateless,” and “unknown nationality.”
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FIGURE 1: USCIS ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION
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APPENDIX C:
EOIR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY REGION
TABLE 1: EOIR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY REGION
1998248 1999249 2000250 2001251 2002252 2003253 2004254 2005255 2006256 2007257
Africa (Sub-
Saharan) 6,565 6,014 6,716 6,634 7,953 8,155 8,277 7,209 5,848 5,349
East Asia &
the Pacific 6,955 9,939 11,646 12,593 14,927 15,785 10,968 10,479 11,269 9,879
Europe &
Eurasia 6,592 4,995 6,484 7,361 8,326 7,200 6,245 5,293 4,580 3,652
Near East &
North Africa 3,014 2,227 2,263 2,479 3,016 3,124 2,280 1,812 1,724 1,627
Other258 73 47 77 79 158 190 176 179 126 205
South  &
Central Asia 6,927 5,537 3,541 3,533 4,256 4,378 3,949 3,927 2,923 2,435
Western
Hemi-sphere 41,603 26,157 21,239 29,260 35,990 28,436 25,775 24,259 29,183 31,808
TOTAL259 72,047 54,916 51,967 61,939 74,626 67,268 57,672 53,160 55,654 54,957
248 Asylum Statistics FY 1998, supra note 67, at 1-10. R
249 Asylum Statistics FY 1999, supra note 70, at 1-9. R
250 Asylum Statistics FY 2000, supra note 73, at 1-9. R
251 Asylum Statistics FY 2001, supra note 76, at 1-9. R
252 Asylum Statistics FY 2002, supra note 79, at 1-9. R
253 Asylum Statistics FY 2002, supra note 82, at 1-9. R
254 Asylum Statistics FY 2004, supra note 85, at 1-9. R
255 Asylum Statistics FY 2005, supra note 88, at 1-9. R
256 Asylum Statistics FY 2006, supra note 91, at 1-9. R
257 Asylum Statistics FY 2002, supra note 94, at 1-9. R
258 Includes “no nationality,” “stateless,” and “unknown nationality.”
259 For some years, the sum totals of the regional totals differ slightly from the
overall total number of applications received as reported in the DOJ Statistical
Yearbooks.  It is unclear why these slight differences exist, but they are not significant
statistically.
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FIGURE 1: EOIR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY REGION
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APPENDIX D:
EOIR ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION
TABLE 1: EOIR ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION260
1998261 1999262 2000263 2001264 2002265 2003266 2004267 2005268 2006269 2007270
Africa (Sub-
Saharan) 42% 41% 42% 46% 42% 42% 47% 48% 58% 59%
East Asia &
the Pacific 37% 41% 39% 16% 15% 37% 39% 27% 57% 66%
Europe &
Eurasia 46% 49% 50% 50% 42% 46% 50% 51% 58% 60%
Near East &
North Africa 44% 49% 50% 58% 52% 49% 45% 44% 57% 63%
Other271 57% 48% 49% 48% 35% 40% 54% 65% 76% 65%
South &
Central Asia 35% 36% 48% 52% 48% 44% 45% 43% 54% 50%
Western
Hemi-sphere 9% 12% 16% 19% 23% 24% 23% 22% 21% 21%
260 The asylum grant rate is calculated as the number of cases granted divided by
the number of cases decided on the merits, i.e. cases granted, conditionally granted, or
denied.
261 Asylum Statistics FY 1998, supra note 67, at 1-10. R
262 Asylum Statistics FY 1999, supra note 70, at 1-9. R
263 Asylum Statistics FY 2000, supra note 73, at 1-9. R
264 Asylum Statistics FY 2001, supra note 76, at 1-9. R
265 Asylum Statistics FY 2002, supra note 79, at 1-9. R
266 Asylum Statistics FY 2003, supra note 82, at 1-9. R
267 Asylum Statistics FY 2004, supra note 85, at 1-9. R
268 Asylum Statistics FY 2005, supra note 88, at 1-9. R
269 Asylum Statistics FY 2006, supra note 91, at 1-9. R
270 Asylum Statistics FY 2007, supra note 94, at 1-9. R
271 Includes “no nationality,” “stateless,” and “unknown nationality.”
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FIGURE 1: EOIR ASYLUM GRANT RATES BY REGION
